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TORTS-THE ACCIDENTAL TRESPASS
An interesting result involving trespass was reached in the
recent case of United Electric Company v. Deliso ConstrucUon
Company.' The defendant was constructing a sewer and in
doing so, it was necessary to build a tunnel below the surface
of the street. The plaintiff owned and maintained electric
conduits below the surface of the street several feet above the
top of the defendant's tunnel. Thus, the defendant placed
sheet metal near the top and forced cement through holes in
the metal to support the roof. In carrying out this operation
the cement was non-negligently forced up without the plaintiff's
knowledge through crevices in the earth causing damage to the
conduits. In an action by the plaintiff for the damage, the view
of the court was that if the injury was the immediate and
direct, rather than the remote and consequential, result of the act
of forcing the cement through holes in the sheet metal, the plaintiff could recover. Thus the court recognized the distinction
between trespass and case, and the action was remanded to the
lower court for a hearing on the question of directness.
Trespass is an invasion of the person or the property of
another which is the direct result of force applied by the wrongdoer. Trespass differs from negligence in that trespass requires
an affirmative act on the part of the wrongdoer 2 while in negligence an omission is sufficient to cast liability on the actor where
there is a duty to act. 3 Force is an essential element of trespass 4 and the injury must be the direct result of the unjustified
force. 5
W"Tith respect to the element of intention, it would seem
that unprivileged invasions of property may be placed in five
classes: (1) specific intention on the part of the actor to invade
the property of another; (2) intention to do the act which causes
'315 Mass. 313, 52 N. E. (2d) 553 (1943).
-Feiges v. Racine Dry Goods Co., 231 Wis. 270, 285 N. W. 799
(1939); see Netzger Dairies v. Wharton, - Tex. Civ. App. -, 113
S. W. (2d) 675, 677 (1938).
* PROSSER, TORTS (1941) p. 190.
4Evers-Jordan Furniture Co. v. Hartzag, 237 Ala. 407, 187 So. 491
(1939).
'Norwood v. Eastern Oregon Land Co., 139 Ore. 25, 5 P. (2d) at
1057 (1931); PROSSER, TORTS (1941) p. 80.
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the invasion, but because of a mistake of either fact or law, the
actor does not know that he is invading the property of another;
(3) intention to invade because of an emergency; (4) intention
to do the act which causes the invasion due to the negligence
of the actor; and (5) an unintentional act which is not accompanied by negligence (liability for the latter is in dispute).
In order to better understand the problem presented by the
principal case, it is necessary to discuss the above classes and the
liability therefor. There can be no question but that there is
liability for an infringement with intention to invade except in
certain emergency cases. The law places full responsibility on a
person who intends to interfere with the property of another.
Thus, if A hunts on B's land with knowledge of B's ownership,
A is liable. Where both intent and knowledge are present, the
trespass is actionable and nominal damages may be recovered
where no actual damage is present. 6
A mistaken invasion (or innocent trespass as it is often
called) arises where one interferes with the right of possession
of another acting under a mistake of either fact or law. Thus, if
A enters the land of B believing that it is his land, he becomes
an innocent trespasser. Although the innocent trespass is actionable, the courts tend to hold the actor liable only for nominal
damages or for actual damages if such occur.7 However, the
burden of proving innocence is on the trespasser. 8 A recovery
bevond actual damages depends on the degree of the actor's
fault. In the principal case the actor clearly intended to do the
act which constituted the trespass. In applying the test of
fault, we see that as between the entirely innocent party who
was damaged, and the actor who, although innocent, actually
injured another, the former should prevail.
Liability for the negligent invasion is clear where actual
damages are alleged and proven. Thus, if A negligently runs his

"Fletcher v. Howard, 226 Ky. 258, 10 S. W. (2d) 825 (1928);
Sine v. Jensen, 213 Minn. 476, 7 N. W. (2d) 325 (1943); Forest City
Cotton Co. v. Mills, 218 N. C. 294, 10 S. E. (2d) 806 (1940); RESTATEMENT,
TORTS (1934) Secs. 158 and 163.
1
Ohio Oil Co. v. Sharp, 135 F. (2d) 303 (C. C. A. 10th, 1943);
Teasley v. Robinson, 149 Miss. 188, 115 So. 211 (1928); Elk Garden
Mining Co. v. Gerstall, 100 W. Va. 472, 131 S. E. 152 (1926); RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934)

See. 164.

"Elkhorn-Hazard Coal Co. v. Kentucky River Coal Corporation,

20 F. (2d) 67 (C. C. A. Ky., 1927); Central Coal and Coke Co. v.
Penny, 173 Fed. 340 (C. C. A. Ark., 1909).
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automobile upon the land of B causing substantial damage, B
may recover. Even though the actor intended to do the act which
due to his negligence caused the invasion, yet it may not have
been willed in the sense of knowing that the act was a trespass.
Ho-wever, due to his negligent conduct, the defendant should be
held responsible for all damage caused by the trespass. In the
early common law, any wrongful invasion was actionable.
However, with the developmenit of trespass on the case, actual
damage became necessary for any recovery where the injury was
caused by negligence.9
There should be no liability for an involuntary invasion.
Thus, if A slips and falls onto the land of B, there can be no
recovery. This is the weight of authority in trespass to personalty" o and the trend seems to be toward this view in trespass
to realty both in this country and in England." The proper
criterion for determining liability is applied by inquiring
whether the actor intentionally did the final act which constituted the trespass. A striking example of this view may be
found in the case of Smith v. Stone 12 where A was forcibly
carried onto the land of B. No recovery was allowed. The
same principle was illustrated by a case where a locomotive
frightened horses causing them to damage plaintiff's stonepost,"
and also on the occasion of an explosion of a boiler injuring
another's property. 14 In a ease where a boy accidentally fell
and his arm was forced through the defendant's picket fence
and against a high voltage wire by the fall, the court did not
hold the infringement to be a trespass and thereby deny him
recovery for the injuries sustained." 5 One notes that in each
of these cases the actor did not intentionally do the final act
which constituted the trespass. A contrary result was reached
'Sullivan v. Old Colony Street Ry., 200 Mass. 303, 86 N. E. 511

(1908); RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) See. 165, comment b., see PROSSER, TORTS (1941) pp. 81-82.
"'PROSSER, TORTS (1941) p. 94.
u PROSSER, TORTS (1941) p. 78; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) Sec.

166. Winfield and Goodhart, Trespass and Negligence (1933) 49
L. Q. RE V. 359, 375.
"-Style 65, 82 Eng. Rep. 533 (1647).
" Brown v. Collins, 53 N. H. 442, 16 Am. Rep. 372 (1873).
I'Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476, 10 Am. Rep. 372 (1873). cf.
The Nitroglycerine Case, 15 Wall. 542, 21 L. Ed. 206 (1872).
1 Puchlopek v. Portsmouth Power Co., 82 N. H. 440, 136 Atl. 259
(1926).
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in a case where a streetcar jumped the tracks and hit a telephone pole which fell on the plaintiff's property injuring the
plaiintiff.',
This view is well illustrated by an early North
(Carolina17 case where a tree fell onto another's land. There the
plaintiff was allowed to recover in trespass even though neither
intention nor negligence was present. Although this theory,
which approaches strict liability, has considerable support,' 8
it seems wrong in the light of previous discussion. The final
acts which constituted the trespasses were not shown to result
from intentional acts of the defendants and the acts of force
wlii,,h caused the trespasses were certainly not those of the defendants. It was force directed at the plaintiff as a result of an
unavoidable accident which caused the harm. The proper rule
here is that where both parties are equally innocent, the loss
lies where it falls.
The principal case seems therefore to be correctly decided.
Whe th'e defendaut forced the cement through the holes in the
metal and into the plaintiff's conduit, it became a mistaken
trespass. It is no defense that one does not know he is interferini with another's possession. That the actor does the final
a-t which causes the invasion is sufficient to create liability. The
plaintiff should recover for the damage sustained.
C. KILMER COMBS

'Louisville Ry. v. Sweeney, 157 Ky. 620, 163 S. W. 739 (1914).
v. Anderson, 2 Ired. 42, 24 N. C. 42, 37 Am. Dec.
406 (1841).
"Happy Coal Co. v. Smith, 229 Ky. 716, 17 S. W. (2d) 1008
694, 194 S. W. 1048 (1917); West Virginia Central and Pittsburgh Ry.
v. State, 96 Md. 642, 54 Atl. 669, L. R. A. 574 (1903); ef. Vincent v.
Lake Erie Trans. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N. W. 221 (1910).
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